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Abstract: The Cuban economic system and, along with it, the Cuban financial system 
has been changing since the coming to power of Raul Castro.  In this paper, we analyze 
some of the changes in the Cuban financial system and the goals of the government in 
implementing these changes.  Using the results of a survey of non-state businesses, we 
look at the microfinance sector – the provision of financial services to the small and 
medium enterprises in the non-state sector – from two perspectives: first, the nature of 
the new credit regulations and bank policies and how they accomplish the evaluation of 
credit to a hitherto non-existent sector; and second, how do these small business clients 
view their relationship with their lender state banks.  We look at Cuban finance from the 
perspective of a socialist economy in transition and compare it to microfinance 
elsewhere, particularly in China and India. 
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Cuba has been changing gradually but systematically ever since 2008 when Raul Castro 
became president. A cornerstone of the current Cuban economic model reforms is its 
openings to the non-state small scale sector: self-employed individuals (cuentapropistas), 
SMEs, individual farmers and cooperatives. Cuban reforms combine a shrinking of the 
state sector, expecting an increase in productivity and public salaries, with an expansion 
of the non-state sector. In November 2011, a new program was announced opening credit 
to the emerging self-employed and SME sector. The government outlined a legal 
framework to expand microloans from state banks.  
On December 2014, the US announced policy changes toward Cuba. Although it does not 
completely removed the embargo against the island, the flexibility measures promoted by 
President Obama have had a positive impact on tourism, remittances and investment 
interest. The White House said that one of the principal objectives of its new policy would 
be promoting the expansion of the private sector in the island. For this it drew up a list of 
products and services that the Cuban private sector could export to the United States. In 
addition, the U.S. government has been studying the mechanisms to allow the sale of 
construction materials, inputs and equipment for private businesses and farmers. It also 
announced that it would authorize projects for the development of microfinance in Cuba.  
With the coming in of the new US administration, there will probably be somewhat of a 
cooling towards Cuba, but it is unlikely that all the Obama administrations actions will 
be overturned. 
In this context, our paper examines the new financial framework for microfinance in Cuba 
and the attitudes of the Cuban non-state sector to it. The empirical assessments are based 
on a survey sent out to self-employed individuals, SMEs, individual farmers, and 
cooperatives. The survey, which is a first in Cuba, consists of 21 questions conducted on 
a sample of 120 businesses in two Cuban provinces (Havana and Matanzas) in 2015.1 
The sample is relatively small but informative and valuable since there are no other 
similar academic studies based on actual data on the private sector and microfinance in 
Cuba. The survey results allow us to analyze for the first time, the factors affecting the 
demand for banking services by the Cuban non-state sector.2 
Although there is no clear sign, as yet, that the Cuban government is open to cooperation 
and international investment in the field of microfinance, the Cuban government could 
eventually consider an invitation to international players in this sector as part of the 
economic reform and rapprochement with the U.S. This paper discusses the 
characteristics and peculiarities of the microenterprise market in Cuba that would help in 
designing future strategies of collaboration and investment in this sector.  In this respect, 
it would be useful to compare microfinance developments in Cuba with developments in 
that sector in other countries with a view to obtaining insights as to where the new 
regulations in Cuba might need. For this purpose, we look in particular at China and India: 
China, because of similarities in terms of the state orientation; and India, because of the 
important role assigned to the state banking sector. 
                                                 
1 The text of the questionnaire is provided in Appendix A. The survey was implemented with the 
help of the Centro Cristiano de Reflexión y Diálogo (Matanzas) and Acción Internacional (Bogotá).  
2 For a comprehensive qualitative analysis of the Cuban private sector, see Ritter and Henken 
(2014) and Mesa-Lago et al (2016). 
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The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 looks at the proposed regulations for the 
Cuban microfinance sector in the allocation of credit for the emerging non-state sector, 
from the point of view of an economy in transition. Section 3 briefly compares 
microfinance in Cuba with microfinance in China and India. Section 4 describes and 
analyzes the characteristics of the proposed regulations for the new microfinance sector. 
Section 5 presents the results of our survey of non-state businesses, including their 
relationship to the Cuban financial system. Section 6 provides a brief evaluation of the 
current system and speculates regarding future prospects. Section 7 concludes. 
2. The Cuban non-state sector and the banking sector in an economy in transition 
One must keep in mind that the Cuban state is still directed by the Communist Party of 
Cuba and by Raul Castro, in his capacity as the President of Cuba, but also as the First 
Secretary of the Communist Party of Cuba. As such we have to relate the development 
and organization of the non-state sector with respect to the possible goals and objectives 
of the Communist Party.  A prime tenet of Cuban socialism is the ownership of the means 
of production and the primacy of the state sector.  The problem with such a strong reliance 
on the state sector is that without the financial support first of the Soviet Union, and 
thereafter of Venezuela, the lack of incentives that has been the Achilles heel of socialist 
state-led economies has choked off any possible growth in the Cuban economy (Vidal, 
2015). The Cuban government, through the state sector, has not been able to satisfy the 
aspirations of the Cuban people.  It is a commonplace in Cuba that the monthly state 
salaries are sufficient only to support a family for fifteen days.  Consequently, the system 
needs private enterprise to supply food and various other services to the Cubans. Given 
the socialist orientation of the state, it is not possible to move entirely to a capitalist 
market-based system.  In other words, at least for the present, the non-state sector is still 
seen as a safety-valve for the shortcomings of the state sector.     
Pleskovic (1994) provides an interesting analysis of the financial systems of eastern 
European economies in transition in the early nineties.  The objective at that time was for 
most of those economies to move slowly to a capitalistic, market-driven system. 
Pleskovic (1994) lays down four planks for the overhaul of the financial systems of those 
economies: demonopolization of banking, improvement of the system of payments, 
change in the structure of ownership (including privatization) and the introduction of 
market-based financial legislation.   
There is movement in Cuba on all these fronts – for example, starting from a single 
monobank, there now are nine state-owned commercial banks, 15 non-banking financial 
institutions,3 eleven offices representing foreign banks and 4 representative offices of 
non-banking financial institutions. Foreign financial institution have no branches on the 
island; they only have a license to represent their bank in connection with operations 
within the Cuban economy.  Although the single monobank has been broken up into 
several state banks, there is no real competition between them; rather, they are specialized 
according to market segment and the currencies they use within the Cuban dual monetary 
system. Some are focused on external trade operations, and loans and deposits in 
convertible pesos (CUC) and foreign exchange. Others are more related to personal 
banking, and operations with agriculture and domestic industries using the two national 
currencies in circulation, the CUC and the Cuban peso (CUP) (See Vidal and Pérez, 
                                                 
3 Non-banking financial institutions operate without banking windows. They don’t work with 
individuals, only with enterprises and state organizations.   
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2014).  This is very similar to the system that developed in the late 1990s in Eastern 
Europe – a true demonopolization of the banking sector will have to wait for a while. 
A variety of payment methods are available to non-state actors, though all settlement is 
ultimately done through the central bank.  In addition to cash, the following payment 
instruments are available: bank transfers, checks, debit cards, local letters of credit, bills 
of exchange and promissory notes.  The financial system has achieved a certain progress 
in modernization, computerization and development of new services since the 1990s, 
but is yet far from achieving the necessary capabilities. The technological lag is evident 
in the non-use of either online banking services, mobile banking services or credit cards. 
Furthermore, an important part of the financial service industry is concentrated in 
Havana and the country’s provincial capitals, making access to financial services 
difficult in most of the country. For example, currently there are only 498 ATMs, of 
which 343 are in Havana. Until the beginning of 2014, about 1.6 million debit cards had 
been issued, of which 1.2 million in Havana.  This represents only 31.5% of the 
economically active population. 
Table 1: Two Banking System indicators (2013) 
 
The number of bank branches per 100,000 adults is not far from the Latin America 
average. But Cuba lags behind regarding ATMs quantity. Table 1 presents both indicators 
considering some smaller countries in the region.  According to information published by 
the National Bureau of Statistics, the ratio of deposits to GDP was 24% in 2013. Figure 
1 compares this the situation in other countries in the region. As can be seen, Cuba is in 
a group with lower financial deepening, together with Dominican Republic and Mexico. 
 
Figure 1: Financial Deepening (Deposits / GDP), Year 2013 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on data from International Monetary Fund and ONEI (various years) 
 
It is in the changes with respect to the structure of ownership and market-based financial 
innovation that there is the greatest cause for hope.  While privatization of the state 
sector is unlikely to occur as far as most sectors are concerned, the government 
recognizes that the provision of consumer goods and particularly of services by the state 
sector has been insufficient and inefficient.  The result has been a shrinking of the state 
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sector and a corresponding expansion of the non-state sector, though the government is 
trying to keep the pace of the two processes comparable, in order to avoid 
unemployment.  From 2009 to 2014, state employment was reduced by 663,700 
workers, while the non-state sector grew by 561,000. Self-employment and SMEs 
created 339,600 new job posts, and the cooperatives and farmers increased by 221,500 
workers. At present the non-state sector is responsible for 28% of total employment. 
Until 2012 it presented a rather robust growth, though this has slowed down, of late 
(ONEI, various years).   
Although the Cuban government has authorized 201 different types of activities, the 
largest activities developed by self-employment and SMEs in Cuba are restaurants and 
cafeterias, covering 13% of the licenses granted; transportation services account for 10%, 
while renting houses and rooms account for another 7%.  There is also demographic 
diversity within the non-state sector; official figures show that 70% of persons involved 
in this sector are male, 12% seniors (over 60 years), 19% had a college degree, and 17% 
kept a job in the state sector. Havana, Matanzas, Villa Clara, Camagüey, Holguín and 
Santiago de Cuba provinces together account for 66% of all private workers in the 
country.4 
 
Private farmers and agricultural cooperatives are also part of the non-state sector; in fact, 
they were never eradicated from the Cuban countryside even during the revolutionary 
process in the 1960s. Diverse forms of agricultural cooperatives coexisted with individual 
farmers.  Farmers and agricultural cooperatives, in fact, have always remained linked to 
banks through savings accounts, checking accounts and different types of loans. This 
would be the segment with the greatest financial literacy within the Cuban non-state 
sector. Since 2010, private and agricultural cooperatives have grown more rapidly as a 
result of the policy of distribution of idle land, given in usufruct. About 187,000 
individuals have benefited under this policy (Nova, 2013).  
 
The Cuban reform gives greater priority to cooperatives over private enterprises. The 
reason is that cooperatives are considered to provide for a more equitable distribution of 
wealth; as such, they are considered to promote principles more “correlated” with 
socialism.  A new legal framework was established on December 11 to promote non-
agricultural cooperatives.  So far, 498 non-agricultural cooperatives have been accredited, 
of which 173 are located in Havana. Around 80% of the new cooperatives were created 
from existing state enterprises units. Most are engaged on foodstuff business (42%), 
followed in importance by retail services (20%) and construction (13.7%). Other less 
common activities are manufacturing, recycling, and transportation, among others 
(Piñeiro, 2012). 
 
There are many obstacles that have been suggested as weighing down the sector: the 
absence of a wholesale market, the high price of inputs, restrictions on imports, 
difficulties in gaining access to financing, the dual currency, a limited list of allowed 
activities, little space for the participation of professionals, who could provide services 
with a greater added value and high taxes. An illegal input market is the only alternative 
to this that the self-employed and micro-entrepreneurs have to ensure their survival (Ritter 
and Henken, 2014; Mesa-Lago et al, 2016).  Self-employed persons and SMEs must pay 
three basic taxes: a personal income tax – a progressive scale is applied, ranging from 
                                                 
4 See http://www.cubadebate.cu/etiqueta/trabajo-por-cuenta-propia/ 
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15% to 50%; a sales tax of 10% applied on gross sales revenue; and a workforce tax, 
which is 5% of the payroll and is intended to discourage the concentration of wealth in 
the private sector. They also contribute to social security (Pons, 2016).   
 
 
3: Cuban Microfinance: How Idiosyncratic is it? 
Until recently, Cuban banks mainly provided loans to state enterprises and agricultural 
cooperatives (particularly the Unidades Básicas de Producción Cooperativas (UBPC) 
which have very limited autonomy).  Self-employed persons and private farmers were 
essentially shut out of the credit market.  In addition, private businesses were severely 
restricted in terms of access to bank instruments of payment and current accounts; for 
the most part, they were required to use cash for their commercial operations. 
 
In November 2011, new steps were announced opening credit to the emerging self-
employed and SME sector. The government outlined a legal banking framework aimed 
at expanding credit and financial services to individuals, private businesses and 
cooperatives. Three state banks, Banco Metropolitano, Banco de Crédito y Comercio 
(BANDEC) and Banco Popular de Ahorro (BPA), are in charge of the new loans and 
financial services. The credit amounts are small (a few hundred dollars, on average) and 
borrowers must still provide unconventional collateral, which may take the form of 
banking deposits, promissory notes guaranteed by a financial institution, personal 
property and certain kinds of real estate but not the permanent house of the borrower.  
Interest rates are relatively low – from 4.25% to 9% – relative to what is common in the 
microfinance sector globally, but it must be kept in mind that these bank loans in Cuba 
require collateral and hence default risk is also low.   
 
In the three years since the policy was introduced, 378,011 persons had obtained 
financing worth 135 million USD at the current exchange rate (as of October 2014). Of 
these loans, 63% (US$85 million) has been provided to finance construction activities in 
family homes. Part of these credits contribute to new businesses, as well, since some of 
this construction is intended for the purpose of renting rooms to tourists and leasing 
spaces to restaurants (paladares) or cafeterias. The second largest chunk of these loans 
(34%) has gone to individual farmers. Self-employed persons, and micro- and small- 
enterprises received just 2.6% of the new loans.  Consumer goods loans constituted only 
0.3% out of the total.5  
  
We will now take a look at the strategy of using banks to finance microenterprises.  Since 
the spread of microfinance in modern times, it is special microfinance institutions (MFIs) 
that have been used to finance microenterprises all over the world, rather than banks.  The 
reasons for this are various; however, an important reason is the small size of the 
transactions and the resulting high relative cost of doing due diligence on borrowers and 
on monitoring loans.  The situation in Cuba is somewhat different.  While the average 
size of the enterprises is still small, the objective of the government is somewhat different 
from that in Bangladesh, India, Indonesia, Mexico, and the various other countries where 
microfinance has prospered.  In those countries, microenterprise and microfinance were 
seen as a way of reducing poverty; as such, governments were interested in increasing the 
size of the sector and expanding it to the poorest of the poor.  In Cuba, however, the 
                                                 




government, while interested in promoting the non-state sector, is not interested in seeing 
it mushroom and expand at the cost of the state sector.  This history of state involvement 
might suggest a parallel with China, another communist country.   
 
State influence in Chinese microfinance can be seen everywhere, even in the most basic 
details of the operation of MFIs.  For example, a hallmark of the early Grameen Bank 
strategy,6 to compensate for the lack of proper institutional and economic structures, was 
to create five-person groups that would constitute the borrowing unit.  In China, however, 
“both rural and urban areas were already organized into hierarchical units under the 
central government. People were not used to working outside of these groups. Therefore, 
microfinance institutions had to create groups that more closely resembled existing 
organizations. In some villages for instance, there were compulsory weekly meetings for 
almost the entire populations. These replaced smaller leadership meetings that were seen 
as central to microfinance’s success elsewhere.”7  Contrary to the existence of informal 
and private institutions elsewhere in the world, China did not allow non-financial 
institutions to offer financial services to the public; furthermore, all institutions operating 
in this sphere were dependent on the government.  For example, rural credit cooperatives 
were established as early as the 1980s, but they were run very inefficiently and even after 
being overhauled in the 1990s, local government interference was a drag on their 
operations and on access to funding.   
 
More recently in 2008, after the enactment of special regulations on the operation of 
microloan companies, a host of state-owned institutions – city commercial banks, newly-
commercialized rural credit cooperatives and others under the supervision of the China 
Banking Regulatory Commission (CBRC) entered the fray (Cousin, 2011; chapter 7).  
These institutions, however, generally make individual loans and require collateral, as a 
rule.  Land is the most valuable asset in rural areas and lack of ownership title to the land 
means that farmers cannot provide collateral to access these loans.  Hence, while serving 
rural areas, they do not serve the traditional microfinance population.  The CBRC has 
approved formal rural community-based mutual aid funds that provide savings and credit 
services to their members.  There are also quasi-formal mutual aid funds that are loosely 
regulated by the local People’s Bank of China (the Chinese central bank) office and based 
on voluntary capital contributions by their members.  Because these are grass root 
organizations, there is less information asymmetry than in the formal mutual aid funds, 
which means better supervision of loans and also the possibility of collateral-free loans.  
In 2006, the central government under the auspices of the Ministry of Finance provided 
credit funds with the explicit objective of poverty alleviation.  Finally, there are informal, 
unregulated cooperative mutual fund groups that provide small, collateral-free loans (Ong 
and He, 2014).   
 
We see in China that the state has simultaneously discouraged the role of private, 
independent microfinance organizations while at the same time – though with varying 
degrees of success -- providing funding for state-sponsored or state-supervised and 
preferably cooperative credit organizations.  Microfinance in Cuba, currently, is restricted 
                                                 
6 Grameen Bank was started in 1983 by Professor Muhammad Yunus in Bangladesh.  Prof. 
Yunus was one of the pioneers of modern microfinance who, as early as 1976, worked on the delivery of 
an efficient credit delivery system to provide banking services to the rural poor. 
7 Clydesdale and Shah (2016) http://asiasociety.org/education/microfinance-china-micro-vs-
mandarin, viewed October 6th, 2016. 
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to three state banks.  It is unlikely that the government will relinquish control over access 
to credit, and hence the restriction of microfinance to state banks is likely to continue.  On 
the other hand, Cubans already have access to a fairly important source of capital, viz. 
remittances from friends and relatives abroad, primarily in the US.  In fact, 13.3% of the 
respondents in the microenterprise survey described in section 5, depended on remittances 
as a source of capital for their business.  What this means is that, one the one hand, a 
complete state monopoly on sources of capital is not possible; on the other, there is less 
of an impetus for the development of state-controlled credit cooperatives with popular 
participation, as in China.  This explains the mix of state and private channeling of 
finances to non-state businesses.   
As long as the supply of credit by state banks is low relative to the demand, the quality of 
the loans provided can be kept high.  This is also aided by the requirement of collateral.  
This mitigates the problems caused by the lack of incentives and decentralization of 
lending authority in state banks.  However, as the private sector continues to develop – 
and this is not at all unlikely, considering the shortages of essential goods (vegetables, 
fruits, dairy goods) and services in the economy, lending by state banks on such 
conditions, is likely to fall short.  Looking to the experience of India in the 1970s and 
1980s, such lending by state banks is likely to become unprofitable, as well as insufficient.  
Lending on collateral is also likely to restrict the advantages of access to credit to already 
privileged individuals and likely to increase wealth inequality.  If access to credit becomes 
more egalitarian, then one possible solution to solving problems of capital sources as well 
as income inequality is to develop credit cooperatives that are regulated, but only lightly 
controlled by the government.   
Microfinance has been prevalent in India since the 1970s and it currently has the largest 
number of active borrowers, about 39.5 million in 2014.8  Most microloans in India are 
funded by bank debt; however, banks do not lend all of this money directly to borrowers.  
They either lend to self-help groups (SHGs) or to microfinance institutions (MFIs) that 
then turn around and lend the funds to SHGs or to joint liability groups (JLGs).  A JLG 
is a group of four to ten individuals that come together in order to borrow from an MFI 
either individually or as a group using a framework of joint liability, where each member 
of the JLG is liable for all loans made to anybody in the group.  An SHG, on the other 
hand, is a kind of cooperative, which borrows from an MFI or a bank and then lends these 
funds to individuals in the SHG.  In 2013-14, 240.17 billion Rs. were lent to SHGs 
(Manohar, 2015).  In March 2010, 58.77% of the total amount of microloans outstanding 
had been disbursed through SHGs (Champatiray et al. 2010), indicating the relative 
importance of SHGs.   
In 1992, the National Bank for Agriculture and Rural Development (NABARD) 
developed the first SHG-Bank Linkage Program (SBLP).  The model operates in three 
forms: in the first model, banks themselves promote SHGs and extend credit to its 
members as a group; in the second model, SHGs are promoted by government or NGOs, 
but are directly financed by the banks; in the third model, SHGs are promoted by other 
agencies such as MFIs and loans are given by the banks to these other agencies.  In 2006, 
about 20% of loans were disbursed under the first model, 70% used the second model and 
only 10% or so were made under the third model.  In other words, roughly half of the 





funds disbursed as microloans were made by banks directly to SHGs.  Such a two-tier 
structure consisting of state-owned banks lending to borrower-run SHGs is thus, another 
model for Cuba that would allow the government to maintain control of the deployment 
of financial resources. 
As noted earlier, the model currently in use in Cuba is for banks to lend directly to 
individuals.  In China, we saw that banks have played an important part in making 
collateralized microloans, while government- and self-financed cooperatives make 
collateral-free loans.  In India, we see a merging of these two models in the SBLP program 
with banks lending to SHGs.  Given the socialist characteristic of Cuba, it is possible that 
an expansion of microlending would lead to a Chinese type cooperative credit society 
model; on the other hand, a SBLP-type model could be more attractive, given the relative 
importance of self-employed private businesses versus cooperatives in Cuba.  Adoption 
of this model would probably require a greater amount of economic liberalization.  Which 
of these two models Cuba adopts as microlending grows probably depends on political 
developments in Cuba.   
 
As long as banks are entrusted with the provision of credit, however, the success of the 
microlending program and its ability to function as a stimulant to the economy will 
depend on how efficient they are in their resource allocation.   
 
4. Loan terms and regulation  
In this section, we will first discuss the terms of the loan contracts, as envisaged by the 
new legal framework for microfinance operations in Cuba since 20119 and then look at 
the regulatory environment for the banks involved.   
 
Loan terms 
Although it would be appropriate to call the loans microloans from the point of view of 
their size and their developmental purpose, most of the characteristics of microloans that 
one may be familiar with from other countries are missing in the Cuban version.  In 
particular, there is no exploitation of social capital in any form to control information 
asymmetry; rather, Cuban microloans look very similar to their larger counterparts in 
many ways, particularly in terms of their reliance on collateral, as we shall see.   
 
First of all, the amounts that are available for borrowing are quite generous.  In other parts 
of the world, micro-lenders have been criticized for restricting the size of their loans so 
that borrowers are not able to make optimal use of the funds for investment.  In addition 
to the size of the loans, the requirement that repayment start almost immediately, along 
with the relatively short duration of most loans, limits the utility of the loans.  Under the 
new legal framework, self-employed individuals and SMEs can borrow from a minimum 
of 3,000 Cuban pesos (U$125 at current exchange rate in exchange houses) for working 
capital for terms not exceeding eighteen months, and for investments up to five years.  
Loans for building and construction materials or for financing the cost of construction 
labor can be granted in amount of 1,000 Cuban pesos upwards (U$42).  Legally, there is 
no maximum limit for any of the loans. The amount and loan term is agreed between the 
parties according to the activity to be financed and the proposed guarantees within defined 
parameters. 
  
                                                 
9 See Ministerio de Justicia (2011). 
9 
 
Most MFI loans elsewhere in the world are provided for working capital purposes – if not 
expressly, then in practice – since loan instalment payments start almost immediately.  In 
contrast, the new microloans in Cuba can be made for investment purposes: the loan 
duration of five years in this case is unheard of with most microloans.  On the other hand, 
it must be acknowledged that the maturity and size restrictions placed on microloans in 
other environments is primarily because of the lack of collateral.  For example, the 
requirement that repayment began immediately self-selects for borrowers who have 
access to other sources of capital.  Cuban microloans, on the other hand, come with 
collateral requirements.  Financial instruments such as bills of exchange or promissory 
notes guaranteed by a financial institution or bank deposits and third party savings 
accounts can be used as collateral.10   Since such assets could be used directly to finance 
working capital or other investment, it is primarily the two other forms of collateral that 
contribute to the availability of larger and more flexible loans, viz. personal property and 
salaries or incomes. Houses, however, cannot be offered as collateral.  While somewhat 
paternalistic, this is to ensure that nobody loses his primary residence; in that sense, this 
is similar to the homestead exemptions in several US states that protect home equity from 
creditors in bankruptcy.   
 
For private farmers, loan minimums are 500 Cuban pesos (U$21).  Such loans are 
available for working capital in the sowing season and crops harvesting; for livestock 
(cattle acquisition expenditures and herd attention); and for inputs purchase and 
investments in facilities and necessary maintenance, land use and development of 
permanent crops.  The main guarantee is the value of the output to be obtained or, in case 
of blight or other infestation, the compensation paid by the mandatory insurance policy.  
 
In addition, applicants for loans must complete a form where feasibility, revenues, 
potential market and business guarantees are estimated.  Also to be submitted to the bank 
are the copy of the license of the business and the proof of the last tax payment (in the 
case of an already existing business).  The banking Credit Committee at the branch, 
provincial or central level, has the ability to approve within a pre-specified range that 
depends on the requested amount.  The ready availability of such formal documents also 
contrasts with the informal environment in which microloans are made elsewhere.  The 
sort of vetting that is possible in Cuba, thus, greatly reduces the risk to the bank.  On the 
other hand, banks are unlikely to have much expertise in assessing market sales; it is, 
therefore, yet to be seen, as to how successful Cuban banks will be in keeping the risk of 
these microloans manageable. 
 
In order to compensate banks for any risk that they might be exposed to, the prescribed 
interest rates include risk premiums.  Interest rates are set by adding a margin, approved 
by the Central Bank, to the interest rates on fixed term savings deposits. The annual 
interest rates for a fixed term account is ranging from 4% p.a. for one year period to 6.50% 
p.a. for a three years deposit. Approved margins depend on the loan purpose and have a 
range within which banks can move according to undertaken risk assessments. Therefore, 
the highest annual interest rate would be for an investment of three years: 9% p.a. in the 
event the bank considered it at higher risk. The lowest annual interest rate would be for 
one-year loan for purchasing building and construction materials: 4.25% p.a. For persons 
                                                 
10  In fact, it is mandatory for anyone with an annual gross income exceeding 50,000 Cuban 
pesos or its equivalent in convertible pesos (U$2,083) to have a bank account. 
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with a legal right to use the land (usufruct), the minimum interest rate for working capital 
and investment is applied during the first two years of operation, so it would be 4.5% p.a. 
 
After three years of bank credit opening with private businesses the achieved results are 
not overwhelming but not disappointing. Official figures showed that after three years of 
the new policy 378,011 natural persons had received financing, worth 135 million US 
dollars to the current exchange rate.   This works out to an average of about $357 per 
person.   
 
Regulatory Framework 
Many countries have seen their microfinance sectors collapse, starting with Bolivia in the 
1980s and Andhra Pradesh in 2008; the main problem has been unfettered competition 
and lack of debtor information leading to excess competition and over-indebtedness. One 
of the strengths of the Cuban system is that the banks making the loans are state-owned 
and under central bank superintendence and supervision, reducing the risk of borrower 
over-indebtedness and portfolio mismanagement. The Cuban Central Bank Division of 
Superintendence has issued five regulations to support the new financial policy. It has 
also set out a preliminary credit scoring system based on international practices.  
Commercial banks also must meet certain standards of banking supervision regulations, 
like minimum capital requirements, risk concentration, and provision policy as 
recommended by the Basel I accords (Banco Central de Cuba, 2011).  
 
The next section will present the results of our survey of non-state businesses.  We 
describe the characteristics of these businesses, their financing patterns and their views 
of the banking system. 
5. Cuban microenterprise and the Cuban financial system 
Business enterprise characteristics 
The vast majority of enterprises in our sample were owned by individuals (66.7%), while 
22.5% of the business were family-owned; only 3.2% were cooperatives.  As far as 
business type, the largest group was private restaurants (19%) and cafeterias (16%), 
reflecting the reality that a lot of businesses have moved into the gastronomic field. The 
rental housing, transportation, agriculture and barbershops all together, accounted for 
17%, all of them more or less equal in importance. The remaining 48% is dedicated to 
different sorts of activities, most of them involving low value-added service activities, 
and few of them related to professional services.11 
                                                 




The businesses in our sample have been operating for about 4 years and one month on 
average, with cafeterias and agricultural business being a lot older, while hairdressers, 
restaurants and transportation businesses were the most recent.12  On the other hand, they 
do differ greatly in terms of the number of employees, whether they tend to hire family 
members, their self-characterization of success and the initial capital invested.  
Agricultural businesses, transportation businesses and restaurants tended to require the 
most capital and also to have the most employees; they also tended to be most likely to 
hire non-family employees.  Agricultural businesses were least likely to report that they 
were successful, there was not much difference on this score between the other business 
types.   
 
Financing 
Another measure of business size concerns the initial capital amount. Out of the total, 
46.85% indicated they started their business with less than 300 CUC (equivalent to 300 
USD); 70.27% of respondents indicated that they had started the business with the 
equivalent of less than 1000 USD; and only 7 business (6.31%) replied that they had 
begun with capital exceeding U$ 10,000, of which 5 are restaurants (paladares), the other 
two being a children's recreation business and an agriculture-related business. Details 
regarding these characteristics, by type of business can be found in Table 2 below.  For 
many families these ventures are a survival strategy, 36% of respondents specified that 
business revenues represent 100% of family income, 16% indicated that represented 
three-quarters and, 18% said half.   
 
Table 2: Characteristics of businesses 
 
We next look at the sentiments of the business owners regarding various barriers to 
running their businesses successfully.  We asked respondents to choose up to three 
different barrier (details in Table 3).  The lack of required inputs is considered the biggest 
barrier to growth, with 71.7% of businesses considering it important.13  The other two 
barriers following in importance are high taxes (45.8%) and excessive regulation (39.2%), 
signaling tax policy and institutional weaknesses as the two other factors constraining 
non-state business expansion on the island. Lack of funding was marked by only 16.7% 
of respondents; i.e. compared to other barriers, the lack of funding is not perceived by 
entrepreneurs today, among the main obstacles to their development.  We did conjecture 
that lack of funding might be considered an important barrier to growth for businesses 
that might require greater capital investment, such as businesses in the restaurant and 
transportation sectors.  However, the difference in initial capital between those who chose 
lack of funding as a barrier to growth and those who didn’t was statistically insignificant 
(t = 0.599).   
 
Most of the seven business types that we identify in our survey follow the pattern 
established above, with lack of inputs being the most frequent grouse, followed by high 
                                                 
12 Two responses that identified their business type as a restaurant also indicated other affiliated 
businesses, one rental housing and the other a cafeteria.  They have both been classified as a restaurant 
alone for the analysis in Table 1, on the presumption that that is their primary business involvement. 
13  Many respondents indicated more precisely that there was a lack of wholesale markets where 
they could buy their inputs; others indicated that they were shut out of state-owned enterprises that sold 
products they needed because they were self-employed. 
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taxes and excessive regulation.  For transportation businesses, however, lack of funding 
is quite important as well, with two out of the five transportation businesses citing it.  Still, 
lack of funding is far less important than the bureaucratic problems created by too much 
government interference.  This may, however, change over time, as the government 
becomes more responsive and reduces its interference. 
 
Table 3: Perceived Barriers to Business Growth, by Business Type 
 
We now look at the relationship of our businesses with the banking sector.  In keeping 
with what we reported above regarding the relative unimportance of financing as a 
business barrier, only 7.5% of our respondents (i.e. only 9 out of the 120 surveyed 
businesses) reported that they had applied for a bank loan during the past three years.  
When asked why respondents had not applied, the most common answers were "Prefer 
not getting into debt" (45.0%) and "Do not need it because I have the necessary capital" 
(40.5%). Other reasons were also identified, but with lower percentages (see Table 4). 
 
Table 4. Reasons given for not applying for a bank loan 
 
Again, consistent with the lack of importance assigned by respondents to financing 
difficulties, we found that most business owners had obtained financing on their own 
(80%, see Table 5), while only 1.7% used a bank loan.  As noted above in the previous 
section, it is likely that a large proportion of borrowers under the new regime have been 
farmers.  Since only 6% of our sample consists of agricultural businesses, it is not 
surprising that most of our respondents have not applied for a bank loan.  It is also 
noteworthy that only 13.3% of businesses said they had remittances as funding source, 
which contradicts a widespread approach that identifies it as the main financing source 
for private businesses in Cuba.  Loans from friends and family, together, represented an 
interesting 28.4% of responses.   Some of this might well be from family members abroad, 
which, if true, would increase the amount obtained from remittances.  On the other hand, 
this could be evidence of an informal, local financial market.  However, the responses do 
not allow us to determine how organized this market might be. 
 
Table 5. Sources of capital/financing 
 
Relations with Banks 
To examine in more detail, the question of how our respondents relate to the banking 
system, we asked a series of questions.  Only 35% of respondents noted that they had a 
bank account, while 61.7% did not (3.3% did not respond).  Of those that did have a bank 
account, most made monthly or yearly deposits (9.2% and 10%, respectively), which is 
much less frequently than depositors would interact with their banks is most countries 
where the banks are a key component of the financial system.  This is also reflected in the 
fact that 43.3% of respondents indicated that they held their savings outside the banking 
system.  In fact, when we asked respondents how important banks were for their business, 
38% said that they did not use banks at all, and another 28% considered them to be of 
little importance; only 19% said that banks were very important, while 12% said they 
were fairly important.  Notwithstanding the relative unimportance ascribed by 
respondents to banks, more than a third do have a bank account; this suggests that there 
is no issue of mistrust of the banking system; most likely, it is the lack of convenience 




We next look at respondents’ attitudes toward the banking sector by business type (Table 
6).  Some businesses that are more service sector- oriented with frequent cashflows 
(restaurants, cafeterias and hairdressers) might find banking services more necessary.  
Alternatively, it is possible, as we suggested above, that sectors that require a greater 
capital investment (restaurants, transportation and agriculture) might find banks more 
useful.  We find that some attitudes of respondents did vary by business type.  For 
example, we were able to definitively reject the hypothesis that possession of a bank 
account or frequency of saving is unrelated to business type.  In fact, we found that 
businesses that had high initial capital requirements or were service establishments were 
more likely to have a bank account (t=2.36 and t=3.59 respectively.  Further, we also 
found that business that had high initial capital requirements tended to rate banking 
services as more important (t=1.96); however, there was no difference in this respect 
between service-oriented businesses and others (t=-1.36).  We were also able to reject the 
hypotheses that businesses requiring more initial capital were more likely to apply for a 
bank loan (t=1.11).   
 
Table 6. Attitudes towards banks by business type 
 
How banking service users differ from non-users 
We now look at how businesses that have a bank account differ from those that don’t, as 
well as how businesses that have applied for bank credit differ from those that have not 
(Table 7).  The test results indicate that neither age nor sex nor the race of entrepreneurs 
is associated with the demand for banking services.  Compared to businesses that don’t 
have a bank account, businesses having a bank account tend to have more employees, 
employees who are not relatives, consider banking services to be more important, make 
more frequent deposits, believe themselves to be more successful and have had business 
training.   
 
Compared to businesses that have not applied for bank credit, those that have applied for 
bank credit tend to have more employees, consider banks more important, believe 
business insurance to be useful, run businesses that contribute a higher share of total 
family income, and seek consulting advice.  Interestingly enough, businesses that have a 
bank account tend to reinvest their business surplus in the business less frequently; this 
may be due to the greater availability of business credit from banks.  On the other hand, 
businesses that had applied for a bank loan did not seem to have a statistically 
significantly lower tendency to reinvest profits in the business.  
 
Table 7. Possession of bank account/Application for bank credit and Business 
Characteristics 
 
6. Evaluation and prospects for the future 
The bank-led model used in Cuba for microfinance has the advantage of providing 
economies of scale and thus, to reduce, the cost of the provision of microcredit. However, 
the lack of previous experience could also lead to unforeseen outcomes. 
 
Along with the provision of microcredit, banks could also expand into the provision of 
micro financial services, such as savings accounts, payment services, facilitation of 
remittances and other services. Taxes could be paid through banks, as also social security 
contributions, payments for electric services, telephone, gas, water etcetera. These 
banking services also have the effect of reducing the need for cash working capital, thus 
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decreasing operational costs for micro-entrepreneurs and farmers. Another strength of the 
Cuban microfinance system is that illiteracy and the problem with personal IDs is not a 
problem as in some Latin American countries. Safe transportation to and from poor rural 
areas is also an advantage, in contrast to the high risk of theft and robbery suffered by 
MFIs in some African and Latin American countries.   
 
On the other hand, financial literacy is still low.  In addition, the dual monetary system 
and restrictions on trade and commerce are obstacles with regards to business access to 
imports and key inputs.  Although using the existing state-owned banking system can be 
an advantage in terms of scale economies, there is a risk that microfinance will end up 
being highly subsidized and unsustainable. It is known that operational costs for this kind 
of institution are extremely high because of the existing interpersonal clients/institutions 
model. These costs are often not reflected in interest rates because rates are controlled by 
the central bank and fixed at extremely low values, compared to international standards. 
Thus, there are two possible scenarios. One, loans could negatively impact the bank’s 
profitability thus requiring subsidies (explicit or implicit) from the Cuban financial 
system. Two, once the demand for loans grows, banks could end up setting barriers and 
bureaucratic obstacles, thus limiting the funding of otherwise viable and profitable 
projects.  
 
Finally, state banks are not promoting partnerships with other stakeholders in the 
expansion of expand microcredit. International experience shows how essential is the 
construction of strategic partnerships that include municipal governments, regional 
enterprises, NGOs, and universities and research centers that could act as micro-
enterprise incubators. Local institutions contribute to the choice of the best projects, help 
identify local financial needs and facilitate the development of “tailored" microfinance 
services.  
7. Conclusions 
State banks have begun to pave the way for microfinance in Cuba. Unfortunately, state 
banks have very little experience in this market segment and have not entered into 
partnerships with other stakeholders. In addition, the low level at which the central bank 
has set interest rates raises the possibility that it is unsustainable. The lack of experience 
with information and communications technologies also represents a hindrance. 
 
In the medium term, if the Cuban government decides to invite international cooperation 
and investment in this sector, it will be necessary to re-examine the legal and economic 
framework in order to design the most appropriate structure.  Foreign partners will also 
need to think of how best to respond to the Cuban government. This study offers an 
analysis of market characteristics and the peculiarities of Cuban microenterprises that 
would help in designing strategy.  
 
Currently, most businesses in the so-called non-state sector classify as microenterprises 
given their size. The average number of employees per business according to our survey 
was 4 with a median number of two and a maximum of 35. Of the surveyed businesses, 
three-quarters said that they had started their business with less than U$2,000. These put 
them squarely in the microenterprise category.  As we have noted, the average loan size 
to date over the three years that the new policy has been in effect is $357. This suggests 
that those businessmen who have applied for loans have been in the lower end of the 
spectrum.  If the policy is successful, this suggests that the average loan size is likely to 
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rise, with a corresponding rise in the risk to the banks’ portfolios.  In addition, 
businessmen from other sectors may be expected to apply for loans, as well.  These 
businessmen are likely to be in more consumer-responsive industries; if so, banks might 
need expertise that they currently lack.  Furthermore, they will also need more 
accountants and market analysts, all of which is likely to be quite challenging for banks. 
 
Eighty percent of our respondents indicated that they had started their business with their 
own capital and many of these indicated that they had not applied for bank loans because 
they did not want to be indebted.  On the other hand, these may well be the low-hanging 
fruit, viz. the initial wave of non-state enterprises who have their own sources of 
financing.  If the market economy grows and the tolerance of the state for private 
enterprise grows, there is likely to be a larger role for microfinance.  The eagerness to 
start new businesses may also be inferred from the fact that while only a fifth of our 
respondents had had business training, two-thirds were interested in obtaining business 
advice. 
 
Another surprising result was that only about an eighth of our respondents indicated using 
remittances to finance their businesses.  There is no reason to believe that this is likely to 
increase, since remittances have been feasible now for many years.  On the other hand, 
any Cuban-Americans wanting to invest in Cuba have had to do it, anonymously, through 
Cuban relatives.  If rules on American direct investment in Cuba and transacting with the 
Cuban government is relaxed, there may well be a greater flow of FDI into Cuba.   
 
Finally, we make recommendations regarding the structure of Cuban microfinance.  Our 
comparative analysis of Cuban microfinance on the one hand and Indian and Chinese 
microfinance, on the other, suggests that Cuba may want to consider the development of 
a two-tier structure consisting of state-owned banks lending to borrower-run SHGs or 
credit cooperatives.  This would reduce the onus on the banks to conduct a credit analysis 
as to engage in the monitoring of borrowers and would certainly be useful until the Cuban 
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Table 1: Two Banking System indicators (2013) 
País Bank branches per 
100,000 adults 
ATMs per 100,000 
adults 
Cuba 11.1 7.3 
Costa Rica 22.3 71.4 
Uruguay 12.7 45.2 
Dominican Republic 11.7 33.1 
Latin America 14.5 35.6 
 




Table 2: Characteristics of businesses 
Business Type 

























Restaurant (23) 19.17% 23.61 7.783 0.870 1.783 3933.33 
Cafeteria (19) 15.83% 80.63 2.632 0.684 1.421 982.35 
Rental Housing (5) 4.17% 42 0.400 0.400 1.600 800.00 
Transportation (5) 4.17% 22.8 8.000 0.800 1.800 3825.00 
Agriculture (6) 5.00% 118.17 10.000 0.833 1.000 3266.67 
Hairdressing (4) 3.33% 11.75 2.000 0.500 2.250 612.50 
Other (58) 48.33% 47.70 1.621 0.362 1.552 815.45 
Average  49.053 3.608 0.558 1.583 1663.96 









0.0005   
Prob>F 
=0.0802   
 
Prob>F = 
0.0002   
Source: Authors’ calculations 
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Table 3: Perceived Barriers to Business Growth, by Business Type 
















regulation competition  
Other 
Restaurant 0 20 3 1 12 11 3 4 
Cafeteria 0 18 3 3 12 10 3 2 
Rental Housing 0 3 0 0 3 2 1 0 
Transportation 0 4 2 0 5 2 1 0 
Agriculture 0 4 1 1 0 2 0 2 
Hairdressing 0 3 0 0 2 2 1 1 
Other 5 34 11 11 21 18 13 8 
Percentage of 
businesses 4.2% 71.7% 16.7% 13.3% 45.8% 39.2% 18.3% 14.2% 
    Total 5 86 20 16 55 47 22 17 
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Table 4. Reasons given for not applying for a bank loan 
 Percentage 
a) I do not need it because I have the necessary capital 37.5% 
b) The maximum loan amount granted by banks is not enough 11.7% 
c) Don’t know the procedures to apply 12.5% 
d) Prefer not getting into debt 41.7% 
e) I do not want to show my balances 6.7% 
f) I find it very troublesome 15.0% 
g) Other 8.3% 
No reply 9.2% 




Table 5. Sources of capital/financing 
 Percentage 
a) Own savings 80.8% 
b) Remittances 13.3% 
c) Bank loan 1.7% 
d) Friend loan 9.2% 
e) Family loan 19.2% 
f) The business is shared with someone not living in Cuba 3.3% 
g) Other 2.5% 
No reply 0.00% 




Table 6. Attitudes towards banks by business type 























How freq do 












Restaurant (23) 4.3% 1.087 73.9% 1.13 34.8% 
Cafeteria (19) 0.0% 0.895 21.1% 0.842 36.8% 
Rental Housing 
(5) 0.0% 0.800 20.0% 0.4 0.0% 
Transportation (5) 40.0% 1.600 20.0% 0 60.0% 
Agriculture(6) 16.7% 2.500 33.3% 1.333 33.3% 
Hairdressing (4) 0.0% 0.000 25.0% 0.75 25.0% 
Other (58) 8.6% 1.069 27.6% 0.586 53.4% 
Average 7.5% 1.092 35% 0.741 43.33% 
Test for equality 




Prob>F =  
0.0183 
Prob>F =  
0.0024 
 






towards banks? No, t=-1.75 No, t=-1.36 Yes, t=3.59 No, t=1.51 No, t=-1.50 
Bus with higher 
init cap more 
positive to banks? No, t=1.11 Yes, t=1.96 Yes, t=2.36 No, t=1.31 No, t=-0.70 




Table 7. Possession of bank account/Application for bank credit and Business 
Characteristics 
 Having or not a bank 
account 
Applied for bank 
credit  
 Yes No Yes No 
Gender of respondent 0.622 0.688 0.625 0.667 
Age of respondent 40.382 43.129 40.857 42.258 
Race of respondent 0.914 0.895 1.000 0.895 
Age of business 58.225 44.027 40.286 49.632 
No of employees 6.119 2.256** 6.667 3.360* 
Type of employee (0=relat, 1=other) 0.714 0.474** 0.667 0.550 
Applied for bank credit (Yes=1) 0.095 0.064 1.000 0.000 
Imp of banks (3=v. imp, 2=fairly; 1=not 
imp; 0=don’t bank) 1.405 0.923** 2.778 0.955** 
Has savings account (1=yes, 0=no) 1.000 0.000 0.444 0.342 
Frequency of deposits 2.048 0.038** 0.778 0.739 
Saves outside banking sys (1=yes, 0=no) 0.405 0.449 0.333 0.441 
Want Insurance (2=believes useful, 1=like 
to know details, 0=believes not useful 1.024 1.027 1.778 0.963** 
Self-eval re success 
3=v succ, 2=satisfac, 1=av succ, 0=unsucc 1.786 1.474** 1.667 1.577 
Share of bus income in tot fam inc (in %) 58.514 65.608 85.000 61.553* 
Has Business Training (1=Yes, 0=no) 0.333 0.115** 0.333 0.180 
Seeks Consulting Advice (1=Yes, 0=no) 0.643 0.628 0.889 0.613* 
Reinvest bus surplus in bus(1=Yes, 0=no) 0.214 0.423** 0.667 0.748 
*t-test significantly different at 10%; **significant at 5%. N=120 






Appendix A: Survey Questionnaire  
Translated from the original Spanish 
Please, answer the following questions by making a check mark (X) and fill in the blanks. Try to answer as 
much questions as possible. Leave in blank the questions you do not want to answer. 
Date: __________________ 
Full name: __________________________________________ (optional) 
Sex: _____ Age: ______  
Time of business establishment: _________ (years) ______ (months) 
                   
1. Type of business by property 
a) ____ Personal (business owner) 
b) ____ Agricultural Cooperative 
c) ____ Nonagricultural cooperative 
d) ____ Family Business 
e) ____ Other 
 
2. What kind of activity is the business in? 
a) ____ Paladar (restaurant) 
b) ____ Cafeteria 
c) ____ Landlord/lady housing 
d) ____ Transportation 
e) ____ Agriculture 
f) ____ Barbers and hairdressers 
g) ____ Other. What? _______________________________________ 
 
3. How many employees? ______ 
 
4. Your employees are... 
a) Relatives ____ 
b) Individuals ___ 
 
5. Have you applied for a business bank loan in the last three years? Yes____ No____  
 
6. If “yes”, provide credit conditions: 
Term _____ 
Amount ________ (specify currency) 
Interest rate _____ 
Warranties: ______ 
Bank payment frequency: _________ 
 
7. If the answer to question 5 was that you did not make any request, state your reasons (you can 
check more than one): 
a) ____ I do not need credit because I have the necessary capital 
b) ____ The maximum loan amount granted by banks is not enough 
c) ____ I do not know the procedures to apply 
d) ____ Prefer not getting into debt 
e) ____ I do not want to show my balances  
f) ____ I find it very troublesome 
g) ____ Other.  
 
8. How important are banks for your business? (Check only one): 
a) ___ Very important 
b) ___ Fairly important 
c)  ___ Of little importance 
d) ___ I do not make any operation with banks 
 
9. Do you have a bank saving account? Yes ____ No____ 
 
10. How often do you make your saving deposit in the bank? (Check only one) 
a) ____ Weekly 
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b) ____ Monthly 
c) ____ Quarterly 
d) ____ Annual 
Average amount in CUC? _______ 
 
11. Do you have savings out of the banks? Yes ____ No____ 
 
12. Would you like to have business insurance? (Check only one) 
a) ____ it would be useful 
b) ____ I would like to know the details to make a decision 
c) ____ I do not think it is useful 
d) ____ I do not know what it is 
 
13. How successful is your business? (Check only one) 
a) ____ Very successful 
b) ____ Satisfactory 
c) ____ Regular 
d) ____ No successful at all  
Why? _________________________________________________________ 
 
14. How important (share) is your business income for the whole family income? (Check only one) 
a) 10% ____ 
b) 30% ____ 
c) 50% ____ 
d) 75% ____ 
e) 100%____  
 
15. What are the main barriers to your business growth? (Check, maximum, the most important 
three). 
a) ____ No 
b) ____ Lack of inputs 
c) ____ Lack of funding 
d) ____ Little demand 
e) ____ High taxes 
f) ____ Excessive regulations 
g) ____ Competition from other businesses 
h) ____ Other. What? ____________________________________ 
 
16. What are the main sources of capital/financing for your business? (You can mark several). 
f) ____ Own savings 
g) ____ Remittances 
h) ____ Bank loan 
i) ____ loan from a friend 
j) ____ family loan 
k) ____ The business is shared with someone not living in Cuba 
l) ____ Other 
 
17. What capital value you began the business with (CUC or its equivalent in another currency? 
(Check only one) 
a) ____Less than 300 CUC  
b) ____ Between 300 to 1000 CUC 
c) ____ Between 1000 and 2000 CUC 
d) ____ Between 2000 and 5000 CUC 
e) ____ Between 5000 and 10000 CUC 
f) ____ more than 10 000 CUC 
 
18. If you have surplus in your business, how do you use it? (You can check more than one) 
a) _____ Business reinvestment 
b) _____ House repairs investment 
c) _____ Better nourishment for my family 
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d) _____ Savings 
e) _____Other. What? ____________________________________ 
 
19. Do you have received any training on business or business management? 
Yes_____ Where? ________________________ No______ 
 
On what were you trained? ________________________________________ 
__________________________________________________________________ 
 
20. Do you think your business has other similar business in competition? 
Yes ________ No______ 
What? _______________________________________________________________ 
 
21. Would you welcome specialized counseling in your business? Yes _____ No______ 
 














Agricultural Products Peddler 
Used Books 






















Domestic Appliance Repair 
Ornamental Plant Retail 
Lathe workshop 
 
